With the widespread release of Exchange Server Subscription Edition (SE) and Microsoft's accelerated Secure Future Initiative (SFI) mandates throughout 2026, identity and messaging security has fundamentally shifted from reactive posture management to Baseline Security Mode (BSM) enforcement.
In enterprise and hybrid environments, Baseline Security Mode represents the minimum non-negotiable security baseline required to maintain tenant supportability, zero-trust posture, and resilience against advanced credential relay, token replay, and cross-protocol downgrade attacks.
This runbook details every technical requirement of Baseline Security Mode across Microsoft 365 (Entra ID / Exchange Online) and on-premises Exchange Server SE / 2019, providing an enterprise PowerShell audit suite to detect and remediate compliance drift across your fleet.
1. What is Baseline Security Mode (BSM) in 2026?
Under Microsoft’s 2026 security framework, Baseline Security Mode is an operational configuration profile that enforces strict identity, network, and transport controls across both cloud tenants and on-premises infrastructure:
- Elimination of Password-Only Fallbacks: Passwords without phishing-resistant second factors (FIDO2 WebAuthn / Passkeys, Certificate-Based Authentication, or Microsoft Authenticator with Number Matching) are disallowed for administrative portals and partner access.
- Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) Enforcement: In on-premises Exchange Server SE and 2019, EPA is non-negotiable. It binds TLS channel credentials to authentication requests, neutralizing NTLM relay and token reflection vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2024-21410 and related attack chains).
- Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) Real-Time Revocation: Session tokens are continually validated against real-time signals. Critical events (e.g., password change, account disablement, user risk escalation, or location deviation) terminate sessions immediately instead of waiting for 60-minute token expiration.
- Dedicated App Identities over Shared Multi-Tenant Principals: Hybrid integrations must use dedicated, tenant-scoped Entra ID app registrations authenticated via x509 certificates rather than legacy shared service principals.
2. Technical Prerequisites & Core Requirements
Before running the audit script or applying hardening policies, ensure your environment meets the minimum versioning requirements:
| Component | Minimum Version / Requirement | Baseline Security Target |
|---|---|---|
| Exchange Server On-Premises | Exchange Server SE RTM or Exchange Server 2019 CU14+ | Extended Protection enabled on all virtual directories; TLS 1.3/1.2; NTLMv1 disabled. |
| IIS Configuration | IIS 10.0 on Windows Server 2022 / 2025 | Extended Protection = Required or Accept; Kernel-mode authentication enabled. |
| Entra ID Licensing | Microsoft Entra ID P1 / P2 or Microsoft 365 E3/E5 | Conditional Access Policies enforcing phishing-resistant MFA and CAE. |
| PowerShell Environment | PowerShell 7.4+ LTS | Microsoft.Graph v2.20+, ExchangeOnlineManagement v3.6.0+. |
| Domain Controllers | Windows Server 2019+ Functional Level | AES-256 Kerberos encryption types enforced; SMB signing required. |
3. Automated Enterprise Baseline Audit Script
The following production-ready PowerShell script checks both your cloud tenant (Entra ID / Exchange Online) and local Exchange Server configuration against BSM 2026 benchmarks, outputting a prioritized compliance score and remediation guide.
Save this script as Test-M365ExchangeBaselineSecurity.ps1:
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Test-M365ExchangeBaselineSecurity.ps1
Audits Microsoft 365 Tenant and on-premises Exchange Server against
2026 Baseline Security Mode (BSM) benchmarks.
.DESCRIPTION
Verifies:
1. Tenant Authentication Policies (Legacy basic auth blocked).
2. Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) status.
3. Conditional Access MFA policies for admin roles.
4. On-premises Exchange Virtual Directory Extended Protection (EPA).
5. TLS and Cipher configuration.
6. Dedicated Service Principal hybrid authentication posture.
.NOTES
Author: Sunil Chauhan (LAB 365 https://www.lab365.in)
Version: 2.1 (November 2026)
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$ReportPath = ".\BSM-Audit-Report-$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmmss').json",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[switch]$CheckLocalExchange
)
$AuditResults = [System.Collections.Generic.List[PSCustomObject]]::new()
function Write-AuditCheck {
param(
[string]$Category,
[string]$CheckName,
[ValidateSet("Pass", "Fail", "Warning")][string]$Status,
[string]$Finding,
[string]$Remediation
)
$color = switch ($Status) {
"Pass" { "Green" }
"Fail" { "Red" }
"Warning" { "Yellow" }
}
Write-Host "[$Status] " -ForegroundColor $color -NoNewline
Write-Host "$Category - $CheckName: " -ForegroundColor Cyan -NoNewline
Write-Host $Finding
$AuditResults.Add([PSCustomObject]@{
Timestamp = (Get-Date).ToString("o")
Category = $Category
CheckName = $CheckName
Status = $Status
Finding = $Finding
Remediation = $Remediation
})
}
Write-Host "==========================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " LAB 365 - 2026 Baseline Security Mode (BSM) Audit Suite " -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host "==========================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# Check 1: Exchange Online Authentication Policies (Legacy Auth Kill)
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
try {
$authPolicies = Get-AuthenticationPolicy -ErrorAction Stop
$defaultPolicy = $authPolicies | Where-Object { $_.IsDefault -eq $true }
if ($null -eq $defaultPolicy) {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange Online" -CheckName "Default Auth Policy" -Status "Fail" `
-Finding "No default Authentication Policy is assigned tenant-wide." `
-Remediation "Create and assign an AuthenticationPolicy disabling Basic Auth on POP, IMAP, SMTP, and EWS."
} else {
$legacyBlocked = ($defaultPolicy.AllowBasicAuthPop -eq $false) -and
($defaultPolicy.AllowBasicAuthImap -eq $false) -and
($defaultPolicy.AllowBasicAuthSmtp -eq $false) -and
($defaultPolicy.AllowBasicAuthWebServices -eq $false)
if ($legacyBlocked) {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange Online" -CheckName "Legacy Auth Kill Switch" -Status "Pass" `
-Finding "Tenant default policy '$($defaultPolicy.Name)' enforces complete basic auth block." `
-Remediation "None required."
} else {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange Online" -CheckName "Legacy Auth Kill Switch" -Status "Fail" `
-Finding "Default policy allows legacy basic auth protocols." `
-Remediation "Run: Set-AuthenticationPolicy -Identity '$($defaultPolicy.Name)' -BlockBasicAuth"
}
}
} catch {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange Online" -CheckName "Authentication Policies" -Status "Warning" `
-Finding "Unable to query Exchange Online Authentication Policies: $($_.Exception.Message)" `
-Remediation "Connect via Connect-ExchangeOnline and re-run audit."
}
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# Check 2: Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE)
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
try {
$caePolicy = Get-MgPolicyContinuousAccessEvaluationPolicy -ErrorAction Stop
if ($caePolicy.IsEnabled -eq $true) {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Entra ID" -CheckName "Continuous Access Evaluation" -Status "Pass" `
-Finding "Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) is enabled tenant-wide." `
-Remediation "None required."
} else {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Entra ID" -CheckName "Continuous Access Evaluation" -Status "Fail" `
-Finding "CAE is disabled. Sessions rely solely on static token lifespans." `
-Remediation "Run: Update-MgPolicyContinuousAccessEvaluationPolicy -IsEnabled `$true"
}
} catch {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Entra ID" -CheckName "Continuous Access Evaluation" -Status "Warning" `
-Finding "Could not query CAE policy via Graph: $($_.Exception.Message)" `
-Remediation "Verify Policy.Read.All permission in Microsoft Graph."
}
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# Check 3: Administrator MFA Enforcement (Conditional Access)
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
try {
$caPolicies = Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -ErrorAction Stop
$adminMfaPolicy = $caPolicies | Where-Object {
$_.State -eq "enabled" -and
$_.Conditions.Users.IncludeRoles -contains "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10" # Global Admin
}
if ($adminMfaPolicy) {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Entra ID" -CheckName "Privileged Role MFA" -Status "Pass" `
-Finding "Enabled CA policy '$($adminMfaPolicy.DisplayName)' protects Global Administrators." `
-Remediation "Ensure phishing-resistant authentication strengths are enforced."
} else {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Entra ID" -CheckName "Privileged Role MFA" -Status "Fail" `
-Finding "No dedicated Conditional Access policy targets Global Administrator roles." `
-Remediation "Deploy the Entra ID baseline template: 'Require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators'."
}
} catch {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Entra ID" -CheckName "Conditional Access MFA" -Status "Warning" `
-Finding "Failed to retrieve Conditional Access policies: $($_.Exception.Message)" `
-Remediation "Connect via Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'Policy.Read.All'."
}
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# Check 4: On-Premises Exchange Extended Protection (EPA) Audit
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
if ($CheckLocalExchange) {
try {
Import-Module WebAdministration -ErrorAction Stop
$vdirs = @("Autodiscover", "EWS", "OWA", "ECP", "OAB", "Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync", "PowerShell", "RPC")
$allEpaCompliant = $true
foreach ($vdir in $vdirs) {
$path = "IIS:\Sites\Default Web Site\$vdir"
if (Test-Path $path) {
$epaMode = Get-WebConfigurationProperty -PSPath $path -Filter "system.webServer/security/authentication/windowsAuthentication/extendedProtection" -Name "tokenChecking" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($null -ne $epaMode) {
$modeVal = $epaMode.Value
if ($modeVal -eq "Require" -or $modeVal -eq "Allow") {
Write-Host " -> $vdir : EPA is $modeVal" -ForegroundColor Green
} else {
$allEpaCompliant = $false
Write-Host " -> $vdir : EPA is NOT configured (Value: $modeVal)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
}
if ($allEpaCompliant) {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange SE" -CheckName "Extended Protection (EPA)" -Status "Pass" `
-Finding "All tested virtual directories enforce Extended Protection." `
-Remediation "None required."
} else {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange SE" -CheckName "Extended Protection (EPA)" -Status "Fail" `
-Finding "One or more virtual directories have Extended Protection disabled or misconfigured." `
-Remediation "Run ExchangeExtendedProtectionManagement.ps1 or apply Exchange SE baseline script."
}
} catch {
Write-AuditCheck -Category "Exchange SE" -CheckName "Extended Protection (EPA)" -Status "Warning" `
-Finding "WebAdministration module unavailable or access denied: $($_.Exception.Message)" `
-Remediation "Run PowerShell as Administrator on the Exchange Server."
}
}
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# Export Findings
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
$AuditResults | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 4 | Set-Content -Path $ReportPath -Encoding utf8
Write-Host "`n[+] Audit Complete. Full JSON report exported to: $ReportPath" -ForegroundColor Green
4. Step-by-Step Remediation Guide
Remediation A: Enforce Tenant-Wide Legacy Auth Block
If your audit detected unassigned or permissive Authentication Policies in Exchange Online, enforce the SFI-compliant kill switch:
# 1. Connect to Exchange Online
Connect-ExchangeOnline -ShowBanner:$false
# 2. Create the Baseline Security Auth Policy
New-AuthenticationPolicy -Name "BSM-2026-Enforcement-Policy" `
-AllowBasicAuthActiveSync:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthAutodiscover:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthImap:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthMapi:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthOfflineAddressBook:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthOutlookService:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthPop:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthReportingWebServices:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthRest:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthRpc:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthSmtp:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthWebServices:$false `
-AllowBasicAuthPowershell:$false
# 3. Assign as the default policy for all new and existing accounts
Set-OrganizationConfig -DefaultAuthenticationPolicy "BSM-2026-Enforcement-Policy"
# 4. Verify policy assignment
Get-OrganizationConfig | Select-Object DefaultAuthenticationPolicy
Remediation B: Enable Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE)
CAE stops adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) token reuse immediately when network location shifts or risk is detected:
# Connect with required Graph permissions
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.ReadWrite.ContinuousAccessEvaluation"
# Enable CAE tenant-wide
$params = @{
IsEnabled = $true
}
Update-MgPolicyContinuousAccessEvaluationPolicy -BodyParameter $params
# Verify status
Get-MgPolicyContinuousAccessEvaluationPolicy | Select-Object Id, IsEnabled
Remediation C: Enable Extended Protection on Exchange Server SE / 2019
Extended Protection prevents NTLM relay attacks against Exchange web services. When configuring EPA, ensure TLS certificates are fully valid, and SSL offloading is either configured with bridging or removed so that IIS terminates TLS directly:
# On each Exchange Mailbox server (Run as Administrator):
# Navigate to the Exchange Scripts directory
cd $env:ExchangeInstallPath\Scripts
# Run the official Microsoft Extended Protection script
.\ExchangeExtendedProtectionManagement.ps1
# Verify IIS configuration for Autodiscover
Get-WebConfigurationProperty -PSPath "IIS:\Sites\Default Web Site\Autodiscover" `
-Filter "system.webServer/security/authentication/windowsAuthentication/extendedProtection" `
-Name "tokenChecking"
IMPORTANT:
If your hybrid organization routes traffic through an SSL offloader (Layer 7 load balancer) that terminates TLS and forwards unencrypted HTTP to Exchange, EPA will fail and block client connectivity. You must reconfigure the load balancer for SSL Bridging (re-encrypting traffic to port 443 with valid internal certificates) before turning on Extended Protection.
5. Drift Monitoring & Automated Alerting
Enforcing Baseline Security Mode once is not enough; operational updates, third-party line-of-business software installations, or manual administrative changes frequently introduce security drift.
To maintain ongoing compliance:
- Schedule Weekly Audits: Run
Test-M365ExchangeBaselineSecurity.ps1via an enterprise scheduled task or Azure Automation runbook using an App Registration with certificate credentials. - Alert on Drift: Ingest the JSON output into Azure Monitor / Sentinel. Trigger a High-Severity incident if any baseline test returns
Fail. - Audit Log Inspection: Monitor Entra ID Audit Logs for
Update conditional access policyandUpdate policyactivity to immediately capture unauthorized modifications to baseline rules.
6. Summary Checklist
- [x] Exchange Online Auth Policy: Basic authentication disabled on all protocols across tenant default.
- [x] Entra ID CAE: Continuous Access Evaluation enabled and active for all cloud users.
- [x] Admin MFA: Phishing-resistant FIDO2 / Certificate / Passkey authentication enforced on all privileged roles.
- [x] Exchange Server SE EPA: Extended Protection enabled across all default virtual directories.
- [x] Transport Layer: TLS 1.3 / 1.2 enforced with modern forward-secrecy cipher suites; TLS 1.0/1.1 disabled.
- [x] Drift Management: Weekly automated PowerShell audit scheduled with JSON reporting.